First World War. Volume I, To Arms by Hew. Strachan

Author:Hew. Strachan [Strachan, Hew.]
Language: eng
Format: mobi
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2004-08-26T04:12:01+00:00

TURKEY’S CAPACITY FOR WAR

‘Turkey is militarily a nonentity!... If Turkey was described before as a sick man, it must now be described as a dying man . . . Our military mission is like a medical board, that stands by the deathbed of a hopeless invalid.’66 These were the words with which Moltke had assessed the military capacities of his new allies when writing to Conrad on 13 March 1914. But within days of 2 August both chiefs of the general staff were sketching out offensives for this ‘dying man’ that simultaneously embraced the Caucasus, Bessarabia, Odessa, and the Suez Canal. Rational assessment was prey to wishful thinking: once again the push to extremes—world power or decline, annihilating victory or defeat— failed to include the possibility of a middle way. The Turkish army was a far more potent force than Moltke’s March 1914 assessment allowed for: by the beginning of 1916 it had achieved major defensive victories; throughout the war it would tie down large numbers of British and Russian troops; the Dardanelles would remain closed to Entente traffic; and Turkey’s defeat would come no sooner than that of Germany itself. But equally, the Turkish army was not a finely honed instrument well adapted for modern war, and nor was the Turkish economy sufficiently advanced to support it even if it had been.

The army to which Liman von Sanders was appointed in January 1914 was a bewildering blend of the new and the unreformed. One historian of modern Turkey has written of officers ‘with up-to-date training for an out-of-date army’.67 But even this oversimplifies the issues. Abdul Hamid had opposed modernization for fear of the army’s potential role in domestic politics. In von der Goltz’s day the activities of the German military mission were circumscribed, its pressure for reform contained. The effect was to channel the Germans’ efforts into military education, and specifically into the service academies. In the 1890s up to twenty young officers a year had gone to Germany for further tuition. Finally, in 1907, six model battalions under German-trained Turkish officers were established for the instruction of officers and NCOs. Two main consequences accrued. First, at least until 1907, training was theoretical rather than practical, confined to the classroom and the barrack-yard. Secondly, its beneficiaries were regimental officers, not generals. Only once, in 1894, was von der Goltz allowed to conduct a staff ride. The formation of the model battalions confirmed the generational division within the officer corps.68

The frustrations of internal policing, which had fostered the army’s politicization despite Abdul Hamid’s best endeavours, and the aftermath of the 1908 revolution served to deepen this split. The older generation, pre-eminently Sevket himself, argued that the army’s political role was disinterested, finite, and above party. Some of the younger generation, notably Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk), agreed in principle but acted very differently in practice; many identified with the Unionists. Thus, to professional fissures were now added political differences.

Most officers, whatever their age, liked to see their loyalties as Ottoman rather than Turkish.

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